American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice Reports to the House of Delegates:  I. Chemical and II. Law of the Sea Convention by unknown




Reports to the House of Delegates*
I. Chemical Weapons Convention**
RECOMMENDATION
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges the U.S. Senate
to give its advice and consent as soon as possible to the ratification of the Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.
REPORT
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpil-
ing and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the "Chemical
Weapons Convention" or "CWC") was opened for signature and signed by the
United States at Paris on January 13, 1993. It was transmitted to the Senate for
*These Recommendations and Reports were adopted by the House of Delegates in August 1994.
**This Recommendation and Report was prepared by the Section's Committee on Arms Control
and Disarmament, chaired by Thomas Graham, Jr. Bonnie Jenkins, the committee's vice-chair, was
primarily responsible for preparing the report.
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its advice and consent to ratification on November 23, 1993. To date, 156 coun-
tries have signed the Convention.
The Convention will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the 65th
instrument of ratification, but no earlier than two years after its opening for
signature. Thus, 65 countries must ratify the CWC by July 17, 1994, in order
for the CWC to be able to enter into force at the earliest possible date of January
13, 1995. The two year delay before the earliest possible entry into force of the
Convention was intended to allow Signatory States time to undertake the necessary
national legislative and procedural preparations and to provide time for the CWC
Preparatory Commission, established pursuant to the CWC, to prepare for imple-
mentation of the Convention.
The Convention prohibits reservations to the Articles. However, the CWC
allows reservations to the Annexes as long as they are compatible with the object
and purpose of the Convention. This structure prevents States Parties from modi-
fying their fundamental obligations, as some countries, including the United
States, did with regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 when they attached reserva-
tions preserving the right to retaliate with chemical weapons. However, the Con-
vention does allow some flexibility with regard to the specifics of their implemen-
tation of the Convention.
The Chemical Weapons Convention will ban the use, development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and direct or indirect transfer of chemical
weapons. It will also prohibit preparation for using chemical weapons and assis-
tance, encouragement or inducement of anyone else to engage in activities prohib-
ited by the Convention.
The CWC mandates each State Party to pass penal legislation prohibiting indi-
viduals and businesses and other nongovernmental entities from engaging in
activities on its territory or any other place under its jurisdiction that are prohibited
to States Parties. Such penal legislation must also apply to the activities of each
State Party's citizens, wherever the activities occur. The Chemical Weapons
Convention also contains a number of provisions that require implementing legis-
lation to give them effect within the United States. These include provisions on
international inspections of U.S. facilities, declarations by U.S. chemical indus-
try, and the establishment of a "National Authority" to serve as the liaison
between the United States and the international organization established by the
CWC.
The Chemical Weapons Convention will require States Parties to destroy their
chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities under the observa-
tion of international inspectors; subject States Parties' citizens and businesses and
other nongovernmental entities to its obligations; subject States Parties' chemical
industry to declaration and routine inspections; and subject any facility or location
in the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party
to international inspection to address other States Parties' compliance concerns.
The Convention requires all controlled chemicals to be declared within 30
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days of the entry into force of the Convention for a State Party, declarations to be
internationally confirmed, and all chemical weapons to be completely eliminated
within 10 years after its entry into force (15 years in extraordinary cases), with
storage and destruction monitored through on-site international inspection. The
Convention also requires all chemical weapons production to cease immediately
and all chemical weapons production facilities to be eliminated (or in exceptional
cases of compelling need, and with the permission of the Conference of the States
Parties, converted to peaceful purposes). Cessation of production, and destruction
within 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention (or conversion and
peaceful production), will be internationally monitored through on-site inspec-
tion.
The Convention contains two verification regimes to enhance the security of
States Parties to the Convention and limit the possibility of clandestine chemical
weapons production, storage, and use. The first regime provides for a routine
monitoring regime involving declarations, initial visits, systematic inspections
of declared chemical weapons storage, production and destruction facilities, and
routine inspections of the relevant civilian chemical industry facilities. The second
regime, challenge inspections, allows a State Party to have an international inspec-
tion conducted on any facility or location in the territory or any other place under
the jurisdiction or control of another State Party in order to clarify and resolve
questions of possible noncompliance. The Convention obligates the challenged
State Party to accept the inspection and to make every reasonable effort to satisfy
the compliance concern. At the same time, the Convention provides a system
for the inspected State Party to manage access to a challenged site in a manner
that allows for protection of its national security, proprietary, and constitutional
concerns. In addition, the Convention contains requirements for the protection
of confidential information obtained by organization to be established by the
CWC.
The implementation of the CWC will be conducted by the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW will consist of the
Conference of the States Parties, which will be the overall governing body com-
posed of all States Parties, the 41-member Executive Council, and the Technical
Secretariat, an international body responsible for conducting verification activi-
ties, including on-site inspections. The OPCW will provide a forum in and through
which members can build regional and global stability and play a more responsible
role in the international community.
As noted previously, the CWC also established a Preparatory Commission to
prepare for implementation of the Convention. The CWC Preparatory Commis-
sion began work in February 1993 in The Hague, the site of the future headquarters
of the OPCW. The Commission will continue until the CWC enters into force.
Its work and recommendations will be approved by the Conference of the States
Parties shortly after entry into force.
The Convention contains a number of provisions that make a major contribution
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to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. In addition to verification of the destruction
of chemical weapons, the Convention provides a regime for monitoring relevant
civilian chemical industry facilities through declaration and inspection require-
ments. States Parties are also prohibited from providing any assistance to anyone
to engage in activities, such as the acquisition of chemical weapons, prohibited
by the Convention. Exports to non-States Parties of chemicals listed in the Con-
vention are prohibited in some instances and subject to end-user assurances in
others. Imports of some chemicals from non-States Parties are also banned.
In addition, the Convention represents a segment of a major effort by the
United States and other states to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Chemical weapons have often been termed the "poor man's nuclear
weapon" and as such, the Chemical Weapons Convention, once it enters into
force, will play a significant role in helping to halt the proliferation of such
weapons. Other steps being taken to combat proliferation include the strengthen-
ing and extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation in 1995 and the possible
adoption of verification provisions for the Biological Weapons Convention.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is of major importance in providing a
foundation for enhancing regional and global stability, a forum for promoting
international cooperation and responsibility, and a system for resolution of na-
tional concerns. The Convention is in the best interest of the United States. Its
provisions will significantly strengthen United States, allied and international
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II. Law of the Sea Convention*
RECOMMENDATION
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association recommends that the
United States become a party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea and to the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,
dated July 29, 1994.
*This Recommendation and Report was developed by John E. Noyes, Louis B. Sohn, and Houston
Putnam Lowry.
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REPORT
For the United States and the world, widespread adoption of a codified rule
of law for the oceans is of paramount importance. The 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea, which has now been accepted by over 60 nations and will enter
into force November 16, 1994, will provide a stable framework for the interaction
of nations on oceans issues. Concerns of the United States and other major indus-
trialized nations with certain technical and institutional features of Part XI of the
Convention, relating to deep seabed mining, have been addressed in a July 1994
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which will be interpreted and applied together
with Part XI as a single instrument. The United States signed the 1994 Agreement
on July 29, 1994.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines rights
and duties with respect to uses of the oceans. The Convention guarantees transit
passage through straits, the right of overflight over straits, the right of sea lanes
passage through archipelagic waters, and other navigational freedoms important
to the United States. The Convention provides a comprehensive framework of
rules and principles relating to the protection of the marine environment. The
Convention also satisfies important United States interests by establishing wide
limits to the continental shelf regime and defining the regime of the 200-mile
exclusive economic zone. With respect to other issues as well-marine scientific
research, management of fisheries and other marine resources, maritime jurisdic-
tion and boundaries, and other lawful uses of the oceans-the Convention will
be particularly important to nations such as the United States whose public and
private interests benefit from a stable legal framework within which to conduct
their activities.
Particularly in an era with new threats to United States security posed by the
end of the Cold War and by the rise of new nations and regional powers, it is
important to seek long-term stability of rules related to the oceans. Unilateral
claims of coastal nations can undermine and change rules of the customary law
of the sea. Unilateral assertions of extensive national jurisdiction over the oceans
can disrupt the balance of rights and duties agreed upon in the 1982 Convention.
The Convention provides treaty rules that are hard to change unilaterally.
The Convention contains institutional features that can help to promote compli-
ance with Convention norms and thus to stabilize the law of the sea. The Conven-
tion includes provisions for obligatory third-party adjudication of many issues.
The United States could choose to have a tribunal review and pronounce on
whether another nation's actions were legal under the Convention. The presence
of a comprehensive dispute settlement system also will help to deter violations
and unreasonable unilateral interpretations of Convention norms. These dispute
settlement mechanisms will not likely be available to the United States if it does
not become a party to the Convention.
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Although the United States was not among the 159 signatories of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea, its concerns with the Convention have been
tied only to certain technical and institutional features of the seabed mining regime
of Part XI. With regard to other issues, the United States has supported the
norms contained in the Convention. The President invoked the Convention and
international law in 1983 when he proclaimed a United States exclusive economic
zone extending 200 miles from the United States coastline and encompassing
over 2,000,000 square miles. He also stated that "international law, as reflected
in the applicable provisions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea"
supported a broader jurisdiction over the territorial sea when, in 1988, he extended
United States territorial waters from 3 to 12 miles. United States representatives
to the United Nations have noted that the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea represents a major accomplishment in the development of the
international law affecting the oceans. The Convention was negotiated with the
support of the U.S. Executive Branch and the Congress through four Democratic
and Republican presidential administrations.
The American Bar Association recognized the difficulties contained in the
Convention's deep seabed mining regime in a 1983 report. The concerns included:
-Provisions that would actually deter future development of deep seabed min-
erals resources when such development should serve the interests of all
countries;
-A decision-making process that would not give the United States or others
a role that fairly reflects and protects their interest;
-Provisions that would allow amendments to enter into force for the United
States without its approval;
-Stipulations relating to mandatory transfer of private technology and the
possibility of national liberation movements sharing in benefits; and
-The absence of assured access and security of tenure for future qualified deep
seabed miners to promote the development of these resources. (American Bar
Association Section of International Law and Practice Report to the House
of Delegates, August 1983, p. 5.)
The American Bar Association also, in 1990, emphasized the importance of
a widely accepted Convention and urged that a high level working group be
established to determine what changes affecting Part XI were needed in order
to gain the support of the United States. (American Bar Association Section of
International Law and Practice and Standing Committee on World Order Under
Law Report to the House of Delegates, February 1990.)
The United States government has never disputed the desirability of an interna-
tional agreement that retains other basic features of Part XI. Section 3 of the
1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, for example, stated that the
United States "does not ... assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights
or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any areas of resources in the deep
seabed" and urged the Secretary of State to negotiate a comprehensive law of
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the sea treaty to "give[] legal definition to the principle that the resources of the
deep seabed are the common heritage of mankind." A widely accepted interna-
tional regime for the deep seabed can provide stable rules for future mining
operations and can deter unilateral coastal state expansion into international com-
mon areas.
The difficulties of the United States and other industrialized nations with certain
technical and institutional provisions of Part XI were discussed at a series of
consultations that began in 1990, undertaken at the initiative of the United Nations
Secretary-General. The Secretary-General's consultations sought to develop a
way to achieve widespread acceptance of the 1982 Convention by the time it
entered into force. They led to the Agreement Relating to the Implementation
of Part XI, which was adopted and opened for signature at the United Nations
on July 29, 1994. The Agreement makes the following fundamental changes to
the seabed mining regime of Part XI that are responsive to the concerns of
industrialized nations:
-Improves the prospects for future development of deep seabed minerals
resources, when such development becomes economically feasible, by (1)
eliminating large annual fees miners would have to pay prior to commercial
production, (2) eliminating production limitations (replacing such limitations
with restrictions on the subsidization of seabed mining, based on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), (3) subjecting the Enterprise, the mining
arm of the International Seabed Authority, to the same obligations as other
commercial mining enterprises, and (4) eliminating the requirement that
parties fund the Enterprise's mining operations;
-Provides the United States with a greater role in the decision-making
process, including decisions concerning the sharing of benefits derived
from seabed mining, by (1) guaranteeing it a seat in the Council of the
Authority, (2) allowing industrialized nations acting in concert to block
decisions in the Council when it proves impossible to arrive at a consensus,
(3) ensuring that the Assembly of the Authority will be able to act only
upon Council recommendations, and (4) allowing the United States to
block decisions on important financial or budgetary matters in the Finance
Committee;
-Ensures that future amendments to the seabed mining regime could not be
adopted over United States objections;
-Eliminates any requirement that would compel the transfer of private technol-
ogy, and requires the Enterprise and developing nations to "seek to obtain
such technology on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions
on the open market, or through joint venture arrangements"; and
-Promotes access to seabed mining by U.S.-licensed multinational consortia
on terms "no less favorable than" terms given to entities whose mine site
claims have already been registered by the Law of the Sea Preparatory
Commission.
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In recognition of the fact that deep seabed mining operations are not now
commercially feasible, and are not expected to become so in the next several
decades, the Agreement acknowledges the need to establish and run international
institutions only on an evolutionary, cost-effective basis. Thus, for example, the
Enterprise will not become operational until the Council so decides.
The 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI includes proce-
dural devices that seek to promote widespread acceptance of the 1982 Convention
along with the new Agreement. Nations that in the future accept the 1982 Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea must also accept the Agreement, which is to be
interpreted and applied together with the Convention as a single instrument.
Nations that have already ratified the Convention will be bound by the Agreement
by signing it, unless they take affirmative steps to indicate their intent not to be
bound. In order to enter into force, the Agreement must be accepted by 40 nations,
including 7 developed nations. The Agreement will apply provisionally for up
to four years if it has not entered into force by November 16, 1994, in order to
give nations time to accept it.
The Section of International Law and Practice, in pursuance of Goal VIII and
the establishment of a rule of law in relations among nations, strongly recommends
that the United States become a party to the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea along with the 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementa-
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